SHIFT LEFT
SHIP SECURE.
You are not short of findings, you are short of the ones tooling cannot produce: logic, state, and identity paths that require reasoning about what the product is supposed to guarantee.
logic testing · reproducible findings · retest
Depth on features you did not have time to reach
You know which of last quarter's launches got a proper review and which got a design read and a hope. It is arithmetic: features shipped against reviewer hours available.
Everything a scanner structurally cannot reach
Static and dynamic analysis find patterns. An agent swarm walks the sequence, which is how multi-step abuse surfaces at all. Whether reaching that state violates what your product guarantees is a human call.
Every finding you forward costs engineering trust
Send three unreproducible tickets and the fourth, which is real, gets triaged as noise. You are accountable for what enters the backlog.
YOUR CHALLENGE
You sit between roadmap pressure, scanner output, and bounty triage, while knowing the real risk is in logic, state, and identity code paths that none of those three surface.
The constraint is reviewer hours against features shipped. Depth on one release means a design read and a hope on the next, and you are the only person who knows which was which.
External testing is worth buying only where it goes deeper than your own team would, and returns findings that cost your engineers nothing to believe.
What usually prompts the call
- →Scanner output generates volume while multi-step abuse goes unfound
- →Bug bounty submissions arrive without context and consume triage time
- →Security review happens late enough that findings become deploy blockers
- →The same authorisation gap keeps reappearing in new services
- →Identity and platform complexity has outgrown what internal review can cover
- →Security work competes directly with feature commitments for engineering time
- →Nobody has independently tested the features that shipped under deadline
WHAT WE TEST
Weighted deliberately towards what your existing tooling cannot reach.
Business logic abuse
- →Multi-step chains where each request is individually authorised
- →State machine violations through out-of-order operations
- →Race conditions on limits, balances, and quotas
- →Workflow approval and review bypass
- →Feature interaction: two safe features that are unsafe combined
Authorisation depth
- →BOLA and BFLA coverage across every object type, not a sample
- →Multi-tenant isolation under async jobs, exports, and webhooks
- →Permission drift as roles accumulated over releases
- →Feature flag and entitlement boundary enforcement
- →Impersonation, delegation, and support-access paths
API surface
- →GraphQL depth, aliasing, batching, and introspection abuse
- →Backend-for-frontend endpoints that trust the client
- →Mass assignment and unintended field writes
- →Rate limiting effectiveness against a determined caller
- →Versioned and deprecated endpoints still serving traffic
Identity flows
- →OAuth and OIDC implementation, not just configuration
- →MFA enrolment and step-up bypass
- →Session fixation, invalidation, and cross-device behaviour
- →Account recovery and email change sequencing
- →Just-in-time and time-bound access enforcement
Pipeline & supply chain
- →What untrusted input can cause CI to execute
- →Dependency and third-party action trust decisions
- →Secrets in build logs, caches, and artifacts
- →Branch protection and review enforcement in practice
- →Configuration drift between environments
Data & privacy
- →Sensitive data exposure through APIs, exports, and logs
- →Tenant data lifecycle including deletion propagation
- →Encryption enforcement at the boundaries you assume it exists
- →Pseudonymisation that survives correlation
- →Data reachable through analytics and internal tooling
WHAT YOU CAN DECIDE AFTERWARDS
Which class of bug your process keeps missing
An engagement that finds five instances of the same authorisation gap is telling you about the review checklist, not the five endpoints.
Where to spend your own review hours next quarter
Independent coverage of one area frees you to go deep elsewhere. Knowing which surfaces held up under external testing is a planning input you cannot generate internally.
What to hand engineering without a credibility cost
Findings arrive reproducible, scoped, and with the exploit path attached. A real but non-exploitable issue is reported separately.
WHAT YOU RECEIVE
FREQUENTLY ASKED
How do you fit our release cadence?+
Scope aligns to feature branches, staging or pre-GA builds, not to a calendar. Findings go into your tracker as they are confirmed, so triage starts during the engagement.
What do you find that our scanners do not?+
Anything requiring a model of intended behaviour. Multi-step abuse chains, privilege escalation through feature interaction, state machine violations, race conditions, tenant isolation failures in async paths, and payment or entitlement bypass. Agent swarms work those sequences at a breadth a review rarely reaches. Whether reaching a given state was ever meant to be possible is the human call.
How do you avoid duplicating what we already know?+
We ask for your known-issues list, recent bounty reports and previous test reports at scoping, and treat that surface as background. Rediscovering your backlog is not a finding.
How is sensitive data handled?+
Under a confidentiality agreement, over encrypted channels, with staging and synthetic data preferred. We do not exfiltrate real customer data. Where production testing is necessary, the data handling terms are agreed in the engagement scope before work starts.
Can you support threat modelling between engagements?+
Yes. Threat modelling sessions for new features, review of security-sensitive changes, and input to post-incident reviews are within scope as consulting work. It is a separate arrangement from a test engagement, and priced as such.
Point us at the feature you did not have time to review
Send the surface, your known-issues list, and what the product is supposed to guarantee. We will test against that.